It is ironic that Joseph Schumpeter, who was brought to Harvard's economics department largely on the basis of mathematical prowess that promised work more in the line of L4on Walras than Alfred Marshall, is today remembered for his broader and more sociological writings. It is equally ironic that, even as we have come to celebrate him, it is for the profound questions that he raised about the links among socialism, capitalism, and democracy rather than for his answers, which have lost their cogency.
surface. And although he made no bones about his conservatism in politics, I don't think that any of us realized quite how conservative he really was at heart ....
Schumpeter went along with the popular belief that the mass of people are led by wishful thinking into expecting to happen what they want to happen. But as I have noticed in life, among sophisticated people like Schumpeter, all goes into reverse: what they should hate to have happen, they paranoidly expect to happen. 2 Interestingly, Schumpeter's pessimism was based, not on his economic analysis of the dynamics of capitalism--which he understood thoroughly and described brilliantly--but on a sociological analysis that focused on the presumed manner in which successful capitalism systematically undermines the precapitalist traditions that sustain it.
It was not Schumpeter but Friedrich Hayek who spotted the flaws in the reasoning of those, like Polish economist Oskar Lange, who claimed that socialism (with its central planning) would dominate capitalism because it would better calculate optimal prices. In advancing the then novel views that information is an essential input in the functioning of an economic system and that bureaucracies cannot compete with decentralized markets on this front, Hayek put his finger on the source of inefficiency under socialism?
Bertrand Russell was thinking along similar lines when he predicted the problems that undemocratic socialism would create for individual initiative and scientific innovation. Focusing on what socialism would do to the former, he advised his readers: Read Plato's Republic and More's Utopia--both socialist works--and imagine yourself living in the community portrayed by either. You will see that boredom would drive you to suicide or rebellion .... The impulse to danger and adventure is deeply ingrained in human nature, and no society which ignores it can long be stable .... 4
On the topic of democracy and innovation, Russell had this to say:
Given two countries with equal natural resources, one a dictatorship and the other one allowing individual liberty, the one allowing liberty is almost certain to become superior to the other in war technique in no very long time. As we have seen in Germany and Russia, freedom in scientific research is incompatible with dictatorship. Germany might well have won the war if Hitler could have endured Jewish physicists. Russia will have less grain than if Stalin had not insisted upon the adoption of Lysenko's theories. It is highly probable that there will be, in Russia, a similar governmental incursion into the domain of nuclear physics. I do not doubt that, if there is no war during the next fifteen years, Russian scientific war technique will, at the end of that time, be very markedly inferior to that of the West, and that the inferiority will be directly traceable to dictatorship. I think, therefore, that, so long as powerful democracies exist, democracy in the long run will be victorious. And on this basis I allow myself a moderate optimism as to the future. Scientific dictatorships will perish through not being sufficiently scientific. 5
Like most economists of his time, Hayek equated socialism with central planning, and he went on to warn of its inefficiency and potential for totalitarianism. Russell argued for democracy and outlined the ways in which socialism and totalitarianism would stifle human creativity and thus rob their own future. Their arguments were fine as far as they went, but it is hard to find great clarity in the way in which they thought of capitalism, socialism, and democracy or of the relationships among them.
Definitions and Linkages
These ambiguities of definition and linkage have continued into our time. The collapse of socialism behind the Iron Curtain was in equal parts the collapse of central planning and of totalitarianism. Yet the triumph (at least for now) of capitalism is not necessarily the triumph of laissez-faire or of democracy. In analyzing what history, both recent and not so recent, has taught us about the links among capitalism, socialism, and democracy, it is necessary to be certain what precisely we mean by these terms, which seem so obvious and yet are so obscure. Consider first the concepts themselves.
Socialism versus "market economies" or "capitalism." By socialism, I mean the public ownership of the means of production and the corresponding exercise of control by the public sector. I add the latter proviso since it is perfectly possible for the state to own productive means but leave their management in private hands (as Swedish and Indian intellectuals have sometimes recommended), or for the private sector to own property whose day-to-day use the state controls (as may happen during the course of the privatization process in Eastern Europe). The regimes that once held sway in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union were fully socialist by this definition, leaving little space for (legal) private ownership and hence denying altogether the possibility of pluralistic economic activity.
Such exemplars of the centrally planned economy stand at one extreme of a continuum that spans varying degrees of public ownership and control. The other extreme--complete laissez-faire--remains elusive: after all, governments get elected or seize power to do things, not to self-destruct h la Bakunin or Milton Friedman.
The definition of socialism in terms of production rather than distribution is consonant with Marx. However uneasy it may make economists who wish closely to couple production and distribution, empirical evidence does not show any tight linkages between productive relations and distributive aspirations or outcomes.
Peter Berger is thus eminently sensible in embracing the productionrelated definition of socialism. "Market economy" or "capitalism" is defined equally by the private ownership of the means of production and the associated exercise of private management.
Democracy versus totalitarianism. The definition of democracy is no less a problem. It is perhaps easy to define it by what it is not: totalitarian states are readily identified. But as Kyung-won Kim notes, democracy may be absent even when it is professed. (I am not referring here, of course, to the obvious travesty of totalitarian dictatorships professing to be "people's democracies.") Schumpeter thought of democracy as a process; Kyung-won Kim wants to take outcomes into account as well. The absence of a spirit of toleration, the tyranny of the majority, the uncompromising rule of the party that gets first past the post in elections--none of these is consonant with the spirit of democracy. Concern with "rights" leavens the democratic process in ways that might be ignored by those wedded to a purely "utilitarian" view of governance. Once again, however, we must deal with a continuum on several dimensions, and also with judgments that we may find it hard to get others to share.
The concepts "democracy," "socialism," and "capitalism," then, may be defined with a fair amount of clarity but still lack sufficient precision to allow us always to file countries and experiences neatly into one box or another. Nonetheless, the questions that Berger and Kim address concerning the linkages among democracy, socialism, and capitalism do admit of plausible answers.
I shall concentrate on two of these questions: 1) Does democracy require a market economy? and 2) Can a market economy exist when democracy does not?
As for the first question, I entirely agree with Berger's view that democracy does require a market economy. Empirical evidence to date shows no example of a democracy that is or was fully socialist (i.e., that had no private ownership of the means of production).
I suspect that the reason must lie in the possibility of political dissent, without which democracy is impossible. Dissent cannot be altogether stamped out even by draconian regimes. But it takes heroes to dissent when the cost of doing so is immense, whereas democracy flourishes only when average men and women can voice their dissatisfaction. The cost of dissent is immense when those who hold political authority also control the means of production: keeping one's job and even sheer economic survival then requires political circumspection and conformity.
With respect to the second question, I would again answer in the affirmative: a market economy can exist in the absence of democracy. The answers to our two questions, then, add up to the conclusion that a market economy is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for democracy.
Empirical evidence again underlines this strongly. Berger and Kim remind us of recent models of successful market-economy development under essentially undemocratic regimes in East Asia. Ralf Dahrendorf's analysis of German history (which Kim cites) also confirms this. 6
It is possible, however, to reconcile this with the view, associated with Barrington Moore's classic work, that the rise of the bourgeoisie resulted in democracy. 7 Both Berger and Kim provide the ground for this reconciliation by citing what I call the probable long-term incompatibility of a successful market economy with lack of democracy. The autonomous spheres of economic action that a market economy inevitably creates will, in the presence of successful modernization or economic development, create an assertive middle class that will seek the political freedoms that democracy provides, s This appears to be the recent experience of the undemocratic regimes in East Asia, where the growth of successful market economies has led to rising demands for political freedoms and self-government.
Today, this process receives tremendous added impetus from the information revolution, which spreads not merely the ideology of consumerism, but the culture of democracy. Democracy has also become increasingly understood as an integral component of human rights, providing the external countervailing power to internal authoritarianism. Finally, I suspect that in the case of East Asia's "little dragons" the direct role played by extremely high literacy rates in both economic development and the growth of political demands for democracy must not be ignored.
In addition to the pair of questions discussed above, at least two others remain of interest today. Schumpeter's gloomy forecast of capitalism's collapse has certainly failed to come true, but can a similar pessimism about the future of democracy be ruled out of court? While democracy has certainly triumphed for the moment, Peter Berger is absolutely right in suggesting that triumphalism is unwarranted. History itself suggests that there is no "end of history." The pendulum swings and swings again. It is necessary therefore to return to the old question that we wrestled with in the 1950s: is democracy sustainable if it will (even temporarily) discourage economic development? Failure to generate growing incomes in developing countries would certainly threaten to undermine democracy by fostering or exacerbating harsh and divisive conditions of zero-sum social conflict.
The other question has to do with transitions to democracy and markets by the erstwhile socialists of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. In what sequence should perestroika and glasnost' be arranged for a successful transition; in other words, should democracy precede or follow a market economy? Who was right, Gorbachev or Deng Xiaoping?
A New Look at the "Cruel Choice"
As reflection on development strategies for newly decolonized countries began in earnest in the 1950s, there was considerable skepticism about the ability of democracies to compete in the race against totalitarian regimes. In fact, it seemed evident that democratic ideas and countries were fated to suffer a disadvantage in this contest. To understand why, it is necessary to recollect the mind-set at the root of the conception of development that then prevailed.
The Harrod-Domar model, much used then, analyzed development in terms of two parameters: the rate of investment and the productivity of capital. For policy-making purposes, the latter was largely treated as "given," so debate centered on the question of how to promote investment. This approach favored by mainstream economists coincided with the Marxist focus on "primitive accumulation" as the mainspring of industrialization and also with the cumbersome quasi-Marxist models elaborated in the investment-allocation literature that grew up around Maurice Dobb.
But if the focus was on accumulation, with productivity considered a datum, it was evident that democracies would be handicapped vis-a-vis totalitarian regimes. Writing in the mid-1960s, I noted "the cruel choice between rapid (self-sustained) expansion and democratic processes. ''9 This view, which political scientist Atul Kohli has christened the "cruel choice" thesis, was widely shared by economists at the time. ~~ Later emphasis would shift away from raising the rate of savings and investment (dimensions on which most developing countries did well) to getting the most for one's blood, sweat, and tears (dimensions on which developing countries performed in diverse ways). Indeed, by the 1980s it was manifest that the policy framework determining the productivity of investment was absolutely critical, and that winners and losers would be sorted out by the choices they made in this regard. Democracy then no longer looked so bad: it could provide better incentives, relate development to people, and offset any accumulationist disadvantage that it might produce.
Indeed, as Kohli has emphasized, the growth rates of democracies have not been noticeably worse than those of undemocratic regimes, H I also disagree with the common view that the undemocratic nature of the regimes in South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong was the key to their phenomenal growth. This is a non sequitur, a choice example of the post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy. These regimes owe their phenomenal success to their rapid transition to an export-oriented trade strategy (which first enabled them to profit from the unprecedented growth in the world economy through the 1960s, and then positioned them to continue as major competitors in world markets), as well as to their high rates of literacy (which economists now generally acknowledge to be an important "producer good"). Both of these growth-promoters were present in part because of the geographic proximity of Japan and the power of its example.
Similarly, India's failures in both these areas, which help to explain its relatively poor developmem performance, can be blamed in large part on the intellectual affinity that its governing classes harbored for both Fabian politics and Cambridge economics, lz Neither East Asian authoritarianism nor Indian democracy explains, in my view, the differences in their levels of economic performance. Democrats have little to fear, and even less to learn, from the East Asian experience with authoritarian regimes, at least as far as economic development is concerned.
Sequencing and the Road from Socialism
Considerably greater ambiguity, however, surrounds the other urgent issue today: the correct sequencing of the introduction of democracy and of capitalism (or market reforms) in the great escape from socialismcure-totalitarianism. Gorbachev's choice in the Soviet Union (assuming he had an ultimate transition to capitalism in mind) was to push for glasnost' more rapidly than perestroika. Deng Xiaoping (assuming he had an ultimate transition to democracy in mind) chose the opposite sequence.
At first glance, the Gorbachev sequence seemed sensible. The appetite for political freedom could be immediately satiated. Economic reforms, on the other hand, would inevitably take time, and the residue of satisfaction left over from political reforms might provide a breathing space in which to implement economic reforms. 13 As it happened, the politics got increasingly more complex as the Baltic states grew more restive, other republics began to assert themselves against the center, and Gorbachev became locked in a power struggle with Boris Yeltsin. These political conflicts tore the economy apart as the USSR went from stalled microeconomic reforms to macroeconomic crisis. The coup of 1991 brought Yeltsin to power; now the economy is virtually under the tutelage of the G-7, and a former superpower has been reduced to the role of a superbeggar in the aid game.
By contrast, the Chinese approach chalked up considerable economic success; this very success, however, unleashed political forces that, illmanaged, led to the tragedy of Tiananmen Square and temporary reverses in economic reforms. Nonetheless, China's path, unlike that of the former Soviet Union, so far seems fairly stable; it has also saved China from falling to the abject level at which the economically devastated Commonwealth of Independent States currently finds itself.
The jury is still out, however, on the question of sequencing---one has to be able to separate out the features peculiar to the Soviet case that contributed to the failure of the sequence chosen by Gorbachev. The contrasting choices of Gorbachev and Deng Xiaoping and their respective fates will continue to provide a fascinating intellectual puzzle for students of capitalism, socialism, and democracy as the transition away from undemocratic socialism unfolds in the coming decade.
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